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Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Social Norms
By Paul Fischer and Steven Huddart*
Research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social
norms of behavior established by their peers. Within an agency framework, we
model endogenous social norms by assuming that each agent’s cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action, defined to be the
average level of that action chosen by the agent’s peer group. We show how
endogenous social norms alter the effectiveness of monetary incentives, determine whether it is optimal to group agents in a single or two separate organizations, and may give rise to a costly adverse selection problem when agents’
sensitivities to social norms are unobservable. 1JEL D23, D82, D86, Z132
Research in social psychology suggests that social norms arise and influence individual behavior because individuals have innate preferences to conform to the behavior of their peers. When
one’s peers are other members of the same organization, such as a firm or a profession, this
research suggests that the behavior of individuals in an organization determines the social norms
for the organization which, in turn, influence individual behavior. It follows from this interplay
between individual behavior and social norms that social norms are endogenous and ultimately
determined by exogenous design choices, such as the organization’s incentive contracts, boundaries, and membership.
To assess how social norms and organizational design interact, we analyze a principal-agent
model in which a principal contracts with a continuum of agents. In our main model, each agent
influences the performance measure that determines his compensation through two action
choices, called the desirable action choice and the undesirable action choice. The desirable action
yields some benefit to the principal, while the undesirable action imposes a cost on the principal.
For example, the desirable action may represent the agent’s productive effort and the undesirable
action may represent detrimental earnings management activities undertaken by the agent. We
* Fischer: Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802–3603 (e-mail:
pfischer@psu.edu); Huddart: Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 168023603 (e-mail: huddart@psu.edu). We thank Kalyan Chatterjee, Michel Clement, Shane Dikolli, Mark Dirsmith, Don
Hambrick, Michael Kirschenheiter, Richard Sansing, Steven Schwartz, Shiva Sivaramakrishnan, Linda Treviño, Amir
Ziv, two anonymous reviewers, and seminar participants at the 2004 meetings of the American Accounting Association,
Carnegie Mellon University, Columbia University, Duke University, the Ohio State University, SUNY-Binghamton, the
University of Alberta, and the University of Houston for helpful discussions. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Smeal Competitive Research Fund.

In the social psychology literature, Lawrence Kohlberg (1984) develops a framework of moral development in
which individuals prefer to conform to norms established by their peers. Subsequent studies have developed psychometric instruments that measure this preference and conclude that the majority of individuals within professional
organizations of adults prefer to conform, although the strength of this preference varies from individual to individual.
A related construct in psychology is the locus of control developed by Julian B. Rotter (1966).

An extensive accounting literature considers accounting (e.g., bookkeeping) manipulation. See, for example,
Ronald A. Dye (1988), Paul E. Fischer and Robert E. Verrecchia (2000), or the survey of empirical evidence discussed
in Thomas D. Fields, Thomas Z. Lys, and Linda Vincent (2001). In addition, there is extensive evidence that managers
make real decisions (e.g., channel stuffing or foregoing research and development expenditures) to manipulate nearterm performance measures. See, for example, Jeremy C. Stein (1989) or David Hirshleifer (1993) or, for some empirical evidence, Paul E. Oyer (1998) and Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, and Edward L. Maydew (2004).
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assume a separate norm for each action, where the norm for an action affects the cost of that
action to every agent (e.g., by inducing feelings of satisfaction or guilt) and thereby influences
every agent’s action choice. To reflect behaviors described in the sociology literature, the social
norm ultimately causes each agent to choose a higher action level when his peers choose a higher
action level.
We incorporate both desirable and undesirable actions, and a corresponding norm for each, in
our analysis because both types of actions and norms appear to be economically relevant. In the
business realm, for example, shortcomings in corporate culture have been attributed not simply
to the demise of social norms encouraging desirable actions, such as diligent effort, but also to
the erosion of social norms that thwart undesirable actions, especially the manipulation of financial reports. Furthermore, outside the business realm, recent empirical studies provide evidence
that norms for both types of actions affect individual choices. For example, Raymond Fisman
and Edward Miguel (2006) study the differing propensities of Nigerian and Norwegian diplomats
posted to New York City to accumulate unpaid parking tickets—an undesirable action—and
conclude that social norms related to corruption are significant and persistent because diplomats
behave like others in their home countries. As another example, E. Han Kim, Adair Morse, and
Luigi Zingales (2006) report that academics’ research productivity—a desirable action—is influenced by the cultural norm of the department that houses them.
Our analysis suggests that norms for desirable and undesirable actions have different implications for organization design. For example, the presence of a norm for desirable action multiplies the benefits of financial incentives, while the presence of a norm for undesirable action
reduces the benefits. In addition, agents’ relative sensitivities to each type of norm determines
whether it is beneficial to split an organization apart to foster different norms in each part. As a
final example, unobservable individual differences in sensitivity to social norms create a costly
adverse selection problem when the differences pertain to social norms for undesirable actions,
but not when the differences pertain to social norms for desirable actions.
Other papers have considered how nonmonetary incentives, such as social norms, have consequences for the returns to financial incentives. In a setting with a single agent, Roland Bénabou
and Jean Tirole (2003) formalize the notion that monetary incentives can crowd out incentives
provided by intrinsic factors. Relatedly, experimental and field study work in a nonbusiness
setting by Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini (2000a, b) supports the notion that intrinsic factors
can undermine the effectiveness of financial incentives. They find that introducing financial
incentives in a nonbusiness setting can lead to less of a desirable action (correct answers to test
questions) and more of an undesirable action (the tardy collection of children from a day care
center), respectively. Their evidence of important interactions between extrinsic (i.e., monetary)
and intrinsic (e.g., a social norm) incentives suggests that norms, in addition to standard compensation mechanisms, merit study.
In an agency study of team production incorporating a norm, Steffen Huck, Dorothea Kübler,
and Jörgen Weibull (2006) show that strong monetary incentives tied to aggregate team production can rule out Pareto-preferred equilibria that are attainable if incentives are weak and
norms are strong. In another agency study, Dirk Sliwka (2007) shows that firms may forego highpowered incentive contracts because they attract agents who respond solely to the incentives

Models of reciprocation have interdependent preferences, which is a feature analogous to our social norm. Ernst
Fehr and Armin Falk (2002) distinguish between two human social desires that interact with economic incentives: the
desire for social approval and the desire to reciprocate—see, e.g., Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000) and Gary
Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002), who examine how notions of equity and fairness influence behavior. These models do not address social norms with respect to unobservable acts, which is the focus of our study.

See, for example, the comments of Arthur Levitt (1998), who is a former Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman.
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which, in turn, undermines the behavior of agents employed by that firm who conform to the
behavior of others. These agency studies do not consider how norms determine organizational
boundaries or membership.
Because we use a two-action framework, this study relates to the multitask agency literature
initiated by Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom (1991). The model considered here differs from
the models in that literature because (a) social norms induce interdependence in the agents’
utility functions and (b) the undesirable action is detrimental to the principal even though it
favorably influences the performance measure. Because of this latter feature, our study relates
to work by Canice Prendergast (1999), who analyzes how counterproductive influence activities
can improve subjective evaluation measures.
Finally, some tax and welfare policy research also considers the role of norms. The tax compliance studies of Jon S. Davis, Gary Hecht, and Jon D. Perkins (2003) and Joel Slemrod (2004)
suggest that social norms are important to tax compliance. In a related vein, N. Soren Blomquist
(1993) and Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) consider the effects of tax and
welfare policy, respectively, on labor supply when norms influence behavior.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a single (desirable) action model with a
single social norm, which introduces and motivates the intuition for the two-action two-norm
model presented in Section II. Section III characterizes the cost of implementing a particular
set of desirable actions, which is necessary for the analyses in Sections IV and V. Section IV
considers how changing organization boundaries, which alters the social norms faced by agents,
affects the cost of implementing a set of actions. Section V identifies the behavioral traits that are
preferred within particular organizations and considers whether contracts exist that attract only
the agents with the desired traits. Section VI concludes.
I. Single Action Model

Consider an agency model in which a principal employs a continuum of risk-neutral agents,
each of whom must undertake a single task. The agents are indexed by a compact set I having
strictly positive measure. The agents have a common reservation level of expected utility, v. After
contracts are signed, each agent i [ I chooses a level of some desirable action, ai $ 0, which
the principal cannot observe.
Contracts are linear, so that agent i’s compensation is wi 1 bi ri , where wi [ R and bi . 0 are
the contract parameters, and ri is a stochastic report that determines agent i’s compensation. The
mean of ri is h 1ai 2 , where h9 . 0, h0 # 0, h91x 2 approaches infinity as x approaches 0; and h91x 2
approaches 0 as x approaches infinity. Attention is restricted to linear contracts because these
contracts make intuitive the interplay between the power of incentives, represented by the bi’s,
and social norms. Furthermore, linear contracts are efficient in this setting.
Given contract 5wi, bi 6, agent i chooses ai to maximize
(1) 	

z 1ai 2 K wi 1 bi h 1ai 2 2 f 1ai 2 Nai 2 ,

where f is a cost function with continuous derivatives defined over the real line, and f 9 . 0 and
f 0 . 0. Finally, agent i’s cost, f 1ai 2 Nai 2 , is influenced by a norm parameter, Nai , which affects

Restricting attention to cases where bi is strictly positive, which is necessary and sufficient for agent i to choose an
interior level of action, simplifies the proofs without affecting the formal results.

If the density function for ri as a function of ai can be written in the form g 1ri, ai 2 , then restricting attention to
linear contracts is without loss of generality because linear contracts are as efficient as any other contract that induces
any interior set of desirable actions by the agents of an organization.
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i’s total and marginal costs of ai. Formally, a higher value for the norm reduces the marginal cost
of ai because d 2f 1ai 2 Nai 2 /dai dNai 5 2f 0 , 0.
Including the norm Nai in the cost function for the action captures the idea that, in addition to
any physical or cognitive cost, action choices have an emotional cost that is determined in part
by norms of behavior. For example, an individual may have a personal ethic that supports hard
work, which we term a personal norm. In addition, an individual may be part of an organization
with a cultural ethic that supports hard work with feelings of satisfaction, which we term a social
norm. A higher norm of either type inclines an individual to work harder for a given level of
financial incentives. Accordingly, we assume that individual i’s norm, Nai, is a weighted average
of agent i’s personal norm, Ai [ R, and a common social norm for the action, Sa, which is the
per-capita average level of the actions of other agents in i’s organization. Formally, the norm for
agent i in an organization I is
(2) 	
(3)

Nai K 11 2 ai 2 Ai 1 ai Sa, where

eI ai di
Sa K     .
eI di

– 4 , where 0 # a
– , 1, represents the extent to which agent i is influenced by
Parameter ai [ 30, a
the behavior of others in his organization through the social norm, and ai . 0 implies that i
chooses a higher ai in response to an increase in the average action of his peers.
The payoff that the principal derives from a given supply of the action is unspecified because
our primary focus is on the minimum cost of implementing the desirable action. Nonetheless, the
principal cares about the agents’ actions because they generate some valuable noncontractible
payoff. The principal uses the report only as a source of information (i.e., the report has no intrinsic value). Further, analogous to models of atomistic agents where each agent is a price taker,
observe that agents are “norm takers” because each agent’s action choice has no measurable
effect on the social norm, Sa. Finally, each agent correctly anticipates the social norm, Sa, that
actually prevails in his organization, which is analogous to a rational expectations assumption.
A. Post-Contracting Equilibrium
A post-contracting equilibrium for contract parameters 5wi, bi 6 i [ I is a set of actions, 5ai 6 i [ I,
such that for each i, ai maximizes objective (1) given 5wi, bi 6 and Sa , and Sa satisfies equation (3)
given 5ai 6 i [ I. To prove the existence and uniqueness of a post-contracting equilibrium, we first
derive each agent’s optimal action choice given the agent’s contract and the social norm. The
mathematical properties of agent i ’s objective imply that the first-order condition completely
characterizes i ’s action choice:
(4)

z91ai 2 5 bi h91ai 2 2 f 91ai 2 11 2 ai 2 Ai 2 ai Sa 2 5 0.

By applying the implicit function rule to this first-order condition, ai can be written as an implicit
function of Sa, ai 1Sa 2 , where:
(5)

0ai 1Sa 2
ai f  0 1ai – 11 2 ai 2 Ai 2 ai Sa 2 2
    5                   [ 30, ai 2.
0Sa
2bih0 1ai 2 1 f  0 1ai 2 11 2 ai 2 Ai 2 ai Sa 2


Note that norms influence behavior by altering each agent’s cost of the desirable action. Norms also may influence
agent behavior in ways we do not model. For example, an agent may bear a cost when affiliated with an organization
with low social norms because he is treated poorly by his colleagues. We thank a referee for suggesting this point.
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To complete the proof, we establish that there is a unique Sa such that
(6)

eI ai 1Sa 2 di
Sa 2       5 0.
eI di

The left-hand side of equation (6) evaluated at Sa 5 0 is strictly negative and increases mono– . 0. It follows that there is a unique
tonically and continuously in Sa at a rate greater than 1 2 a
value of Sa, which is positive and finite, that satisfies equation (6). Hence, we have the following
lemma.
LEMMA 1: For any set of contracts, 5 wi, bi 6 i [ I for organization I, there exists a unique postcontracting equilibrium, 5 ai 6 i [ I .
B. Multiplier Effects

To gain some insight into the role played by the social norm, we present comparative statics in a
setting where all agents have identical contracts and preferences so that bi 5 b, Ai 5 A, and ai 5 a
for all i [ I. As a result, ai 5 a for i [ I. Analysis of the first-order condition (4) leads to
(7)

da
0z91a 2/0y
dSa
a f  0 1a 2 Na 2
   5               1                ,
dy 2bh0 1a 2 1 11 2 a 2 f  0 1a 2 Na 2 dy 2bh0 1a 2 1 f  0 1a 2 Na 2

where y is b, A, or a and dSa /dy is the change in the post contracting equilibrium social norm
implied by (6). The first term on the right-hand side of equation (7), which is proportional to
0z91a 2/0y, is the direct effect of the parameter change on agents’ actions. The second term, which
is proportional to dSa /dy, captures the impact of the change in the norm attributable to the change
in the exogenous parameter. Furthermore, because a 5 Sa, this indirect effect is of the same sign
as the direct effect. Assuming agents are sensitive to the social norm 1i.e., a . 02 , the indirect
effect multiplies the direct effect. For example, if the direct effect causes each agent to work a
bit harder, the additional hard work favorably affects the social norm which, in turn, causes each
agent to work harder still. Formally, we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 1: Assume identical agents with identical contracts. The agents’ actions are
increasing in the power of incentives, da/db . 0, and increasing in their personal norm, da/dA
. 0. Whether the agents’ actions are increasing or decreasing in the agents’ sensitivities to the
social norm depends on whether the social norm is higher or lower than the personal norm:
da/da . 0 if Sa . A, and da/da , 0 if Sa , A.
Consider, first, changes in the incentive parameter b. The direct effect is positive—greater
incentives induce more of the desirable action—and this effect is reinforced by the concomitant increase in the social norm. An increase in the agents’ respective personal norms, A, also
increases the desirable action. Again, because the increased personal norm translates into more
desirable action, the social norm also increases, which induces yet higher effort. Finally, consider
changes in the sensitivity to the social norm. If the social norm, Sa, is higher (lower) than the
personal norm for each agent, A, an increase in agents’ sensitivity to the social norm increases
(decreases) the total norm, Na, which provides a direct incentive to take a higher action, a. This
direct effect is multiplied because the social norm also increases (decreases), which induces even
more (less) desirable action. In summary, in the single-action setting, the social norm multiplies
the effect on a of any change in the exogenous parameters.

1464

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

September 2008

II. Desirable and Undesirable Action Choices with Two Norms

Norms influence desirable actions, but they may also influence undesirable actions. For
example, as discussed in the introduction, employees can engage in costly earnings management activities that improve reported performance but ultimately reduce firm value. To introduce
norms that influence undesirable actions, we extend the base model to include a second action
choice with its own norm. In the main model, each agent i chooses two unobservable actions that
affect the principal’s welfare, a desirable action, ai $ 0, and an undesirable action, ui $ 0. The
undesirable action, ui, imposes a cost on the principal of ki ui where ki . 0. Agent i’s compensation is again restricted to be linear in a report, ri; however, the mean of ri is now h 1ai 1 ui 2. As
a consequence, the report does not allow the principal to distinguish ai from ui. In addition, the
agent’s objective includes a cost associated with the undesirable action:
(8) 	

z 1ai, ui 2 K wi 1 bih 1ai 1 ui 2 2 f 1ai 2 Nai 2 2 f 1ui 1 Nui 2.

Consistent with the notion that a higher level of the norm for the undesirable action should
discourage the agent from taking that action, a higher value for the norm increases the marginal
cost of ui 1i.e., 0 2 f 1ui 1 Nui 2/0ui 0Nui 5 f  0 . 02.
The norm associated with the undesirable action is defined in a manner analogous to the norm
for the desirable action:
(9)
(10)

Nui K 11 2 mi 2 Ui 1 mi Su, where

eI ui di
Su K 2    
eI di

is the social norm for the undesirable action, Ui is agent i ’s personal norm for the undesirable
– 4 , where 0 # m
– , 1, captures the extent to which agent i is influenced by
action, and mi [ 30, m
the undesirable behavior of others in the organization. In contrast to the desirable action social
norm specification in (3), Su is defined so that the undesirable action norm for an agent is reduced
when other agents engage in more of that action. This assumption, coupled with the assumption
that a higher norm for undesirable action increases an agent’s personal cost of that action, implies
that an agent engages in more of the undesirable action when others in the organization engage
in more of that action.
A. Post-Contracting Equilibrium
A post-contracting equilibrium for an organization of agents I, who have contracts 5wi, bi 6 i [ I,
is defined as a set of actions, 5ai, ui 6 i [ I, such that: (a) each agent’s action choices maximize
objective (8) given 5wi, bi 6 i [ I; and (b) Sa and Su satisfy equations (3) and (10) given 5ai, ui 6 i [ I.
As in the single-action model, the proof that there exists a unique post-contracting equilibrium
begins by characterizing each agent’s action choices as a function of the contract parameters
and the social norms. The proof is completed by demonstrating that there exists a unique pair
of social norms, Sa and Su, that satisfy (3) and (10). This and all subsequent proofs are in a Web
Appendix (available at http://www.aeaweb.og/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.4.1459).
LEMMA 2: For any set of contracts, 5 wi, bi 6 i [ I for organization I, there exists a unique postc ontracting equilibrium, 5 ai, ui 6 i [ I . If all agent choices are interior, then ai 2 Nai 5 ui 1 Nui
for all i.

The observation that ai 2 Nai 5 ui 1 Nui when the agents’ choices are interior implies that
the action mix selected by agent i shifts toward the desirable action as either his norm for the
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d esirable action, Nai , increases or his norm for the undesirable action, Nui , increases. A higher
norm for the desirable action reduces the marginal cost of that action to the agent. A higher norm
for the undesirable action increases the marginal cost of that action, which induces the agent to
supply more of the desirable action.
B. Multiplier Effects
In the single action setting, we demonstrated that the social norm for the desirable action multiplies the impact of changes in exogenous parameters on the desirable action choice. With two
actions and a social norm for each, there are two multiplier effects, which can have offsetting
effects on an agent’s desirable action choice. To illustrate, we again employ a setting with identical contracts and agents: bi 5 b, Ai 5 A, Ui 5 U, ai 5 a, and mi 5 m for i [ I. As a result, ai 5
a and ui 5 u for i [ I. Throughout, interior choices for both actions are assumed.
Consider the impact of an increase in the power of incentives, b. Holding constant the social
norms, the direct effect of the increase in b on the desirable and undesirable action choice leads
to an increase in both actions. The increase in the desirable action choice causes an increase in
the desirable action social norm, which yields the same multiplier effect as in the single action
setting by making the desirable action less costly to each agent. The increase in the undesirable
action choice causes a decrease in the undesirable action social norm, which makes the undesirable action less costly as well. If the two multipliers are unequal, the action mix shifts toward
the action choice with the larger multiplier. Hence, if the multiplier on the undesirable action is
larger, which occurs when m is large, the impact of the change in b on the desirable action is
mitigated by the social norm for the undesirable action. It turns out that this effect is never large
enough to dominate the direct effect, although the effect of an increase in b on the desirable
action approaches zero as the agents’ sensitivity to the social norm for the undesirable action, m,
approaches its upper bound, one.
When the personal norm for either the desirable or the undesirable action increases, the direct
effect of the change causes the action mix to shift toward the desirable action. The change in
the mix causes both social norms to increase, implying that each social norm creates a positive
multiplier effect on the desirable action choices. If the social norm is higher than the personal
norm 1 e.g., Sa . A or Su . U2 , then an increase in the sensitivity to either social norm causes the
desirable action to increase. If the social norm is lower than the personal norm, then an increase
in the sensitivity to either social norm causes the undesirable action to decrease. The following
corollary summarizes these observations.
COROLLARY 2: Assume identical agents with identical contracts in the setting where the
agents choose desirable and undesirable actions, and these actions are interior. The desirable
and undesirable action choices for each agent are increasing in the power of incentives: da/db
. 0 and du/db . 0. The desirable action choice is increasing and the undesirable action choice
is decreasing in either personal norm: da/dA . 0, da/dU . 0, du/dA , 0, and du/dU , 0.
Whether the desirable and undesirable actions are increasing or decreasing in the agents’ sensitivities to the social norms depends on whether the social norm is higher or lower than the
personal norm: (i) da/da . 0 and du/da , 0 if Sa . A, (ii) da/da , 0 and du/da . 0 if Sa, A,
(iii) da/dm . 0 and du/dm , 0 if Su . U, and (iv) da/dm , 0 and du/dm . 0 if Su , U.
III. Per-Capita Implementation Costs

The post-contracting equilibrium allows us to determine the minimum cost to implement a
specific set of desirable actions. The cost functions prove useful in analyzing how organizations
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can be structured to exploit endogenous social norms and how agents with differing behavioral
traits (e.g., one’s sensitivity to a social norm) can be allocated to organizations so as to minimize
implementation costs. We develop the case of the desirable and undesirable actions. The results
in the single-action setting are easily inferred from the more general setting.
An optimal contract set for implementing 5ai 6 i [ I is a 5wi, bi 6 i [ I that minimizes the sum of
the per-capita expected compensation and undesirable action costs,

eI wi 1 bi h 1ai 1 ui 2 1 ki ui di
              ,
eI di

subject to each agent attaining his reservation level of expected utility, z 1ai , ui 2 $ v; ai and ui
maximize z 1ai , ui 2 for each i; and, the endogenous social norms satisfy conditions (3) and (10).
The reservation constraint for each agent i is always binding, so the principal’s objective can
be rewritten as a function of the desirable actions, 5ai 6 i [ I, and the induced set of undesirable
actions, 5ui 6 i [ I:
(11) 	

eI 3v 1 f 1ai 2 Nai 2 1 f 1ui 1 Nui 2 1 ki ui 4 di
                   
.
eI di

The restated objective function (11) identifies the components of the cost to the principal of
inducing a given level of the desirable action. The desirable action cost to the principal is simply
the cost to the agent, f 1ai 2 Nai 2. In contrast, the undesirable action imposes costs on the principal from two sources. First, there is the cost that arises from putting the agents into a situation
where they are induced to take undesirable actions, f 1ui 1 Nui 2. This cost of undertaking ui is
borne directly by agent i and indirectly by the principal, who pays agent i’s wages. Second, there
is the direct cost of the undesirable action to the principal, ki ui.
If both ai and ui are strictly positive for i [ I, which we assume for the remainder of the paper,
then the principal’s problem can be exploited to characterize the minimum cost of implementing
5ai 6 i[I as a function of those actions, as well as the exogenous variables. In particular, recall
from Lemma 2 that ai 2 Nai 5 ui 1 Nui for each agent. It follows that the cost function (11) can
be written
(12)

eI v 1 2 f 1ai 2 Nai 2 1 ki 1ai 2 Nai 2 Nui 2 di
                    
,
eI di

where Nai 5 11 2 ai 2 Ai 1 ai Sa, Nui 5 11 2 mi 2Ui 1 mi Su, Sa 5 eI ai di / eI di, and
(13) 	

eI 11 2 ai 2 1Ai 2 Sa 2 1 11 2 mi 2 Ui di
Su 5                 .
eI 11 2 mi 2 di

Consider the relation between the set of desirable actions induced and each of the social
norms. When financial incentives are increased, there is an interdependent set of effects on
action choices and norms. First, the level of desirable action chosen by the agents increases.
Second, the social norm for the desirable action increases, which follows directly from the definition of the social norm for the desirable action. Third, it follows from (13) that the social norm
for the undesirable action decreases when the social norm for the desirable action increases. This
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relation arises because more undesirable action is induced by the increased financial incentives.
The increase in undesirable action, in turn, erodes the social norm that discourages the undesirable action. Hence, motivating the agents to increase the level of the desirable action necessarily
leads them to supply more of the undesirable action and also erodes the social norm thwarting
the undesirable action.
IV. Organizational Boundaries

Economic entities often include individuals who specialize in different productive activities
(e.g., auditing and consulting, or sales and service). If the returns to desirable actions across
productive actions differ, it is preferable to induce higher levels of desirable action from some
individuals than from others. Section III established that the cost of implementing a level of
desirable action from an individual is a function of the social norm faced by that individual
which is, in turn, a function of the behavior of others in the same organization. By managing
the boundaries of each agent’s organization, then, it is possible to alter the implementation cost
of a given set of desirable actions. In this section, a simple example highlights factors that may
induce organizations to combine or subdivide so as to alter social norms and thereby lower
implementation costs.
Assume a set of identical agents indexed on 30, 14 are to be employed. All agents have the same
behavioral traits: Ai 5 A, ai 5 a, Ui 5 U, and mi 5 m for i [ 30, 14 . A high level of the desirable action, ah, is required for a proportion d [ 10, 12 of the agents, and a lower level, al , ah, is
required from the remaining agents. The former opportunity might be thought of as a new line of
business with growth prospects and the latter as a mature line of business. Throughout our analysis, we assume that these actions are independent of organizational structure. Hence, our analysis
is concerned with identifying the least costly structure for a given set of desirable actions.
To demonstrate how organizational boundaries matter, consider two possible cases. In the first
case, all agents work in the same organization, so the social norm is computed over all agents.
In the second case, there are two organizations, each with its own social norm. One organization
implements al from each agent and employs proportion 1 2 d of the agents. The other organization implements ah from each agent and employs the remaining agents.
Two sources of cost must be considered when comparing the costs associated with single and
separate organizations: the costs of compensating the agents, and the costs of undesirable actions
incurred by the principal. We assume that these latter costs increase linearly in the per capita
level of the undesirable action. Parameters kh and kl denote the unit costs to the principal of the
undesirable actions by the agents producing ah and al, respectively. We assume these costs, too,
are independent of organizational structure. Given the specific additional assumptions in this
section, the single-organization implementation cost is
(14)

C1 5 v 1 d 3  f 1ah 2 Nâ2 1 f 1ûh 1 Nû2 1 kh ûh 4

1 11 2 d 2 3  f 1al 2 Nâ2 1 f 1ûl 1 Nû2 1 kl ûl 4 ,

where ûj denotes the undesirable action of the agents who implement aj when there is a single
organization, and Nâ 5 11 2 a 2 A 1 a 3dah 1 11 2 d 2 al 4 and Nû 5 11 2 m 2 U 2 m 3dûh 1 11 2 d 2 ûl 4

One approach to creating organization boundaries is to create separate firms. A more subtle approach that may
introduce boundaries within a firm involves putting physical or social distance between employees engaging in different tasks.
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are, respectively, the norms associated with the desirable and undesirable actions in the single
organization. The two-organization implementation cost is
(15)

C2 5 v 1 d 3  f 1ah 2 Nah 2 1 f 1uh 1 Nuh 2 1 kh u h 4

1 11 2 d 2 3  f 1al 2 Nal 2 1 f 1ul 1 Nul 2 1 kl u l 4 ,

where uj denotes the undesirable action of the agents who implement aj when there are two
organizations, and Nah 5 11 2 a 2 A 1 aah, Nuh 5 11 2 m 2 U2 muh, Nal 5 11 2 a 2 A 1 aal, and
Nul 5 11 2 m 2U 2 mul are the norms on desirable and undesirable actions associated with the
implementing ah and al, respectively, in separate organizations.
A. Cost Comparison
Compare first the compensation costs across the one- and two-organization structures, given
in (14) and (15), which exclude the terms involving kh or kl. With separate organizations, neither
agent type influences the other type, so the desirable action social norm and the agent’s desirable
action choice coincide: Sah 5 ah and Sal 5 al. In contrast, with a single organization, there is a
common desirable action social norm, Sâ , which is between the levels of action implemented for
the two agent types: al , Sâ 5 dah 1 11 2 d 2 al , ah. Therefore, the norm faced by an agent in
a single organization Nâ satisfies Nal , Nâ , Nah. Relative to the case with separate organizations, it follows that agents who implement ah in a single organization incur higher costs of the
desirable action because the desirable action social norm is intermediate (rather than high), while
agents who implement al incur a lower cost because the norm is intermediate (rather than low).
Assessing the difference in costs incurred by the agents for the undesirable action is more
complicated because the undesirable action social norm and the undesirable action choices
themselves differ across the organization structures.10 Lemma 2 guarantees that ai 2 Nai 5 ui 1
Nui, which simplifies matters because agents’ costs for the undesirable action are identical to their
costs for the desirable action. This observation, coupled with the discussion of costs for desirable actions above, implies that agents implementing ah incur lower costs for undesirable actions
in separate organizations, while the agents implementing al incur higher costs for undesirable
actions in separate organizations.
Relative to the case with separate organizations, the convexity of the cost function, f, implies
that the higher costs incurred by the agents implementing ah in a single organization exceed the
lower costs faced by the agents implementing al. Consequently, separate organizations minimize
the total compensation costs.
Having established that separate organizations minimize the compensation costs, consider
next the principal’s total costs, which also include the direct cost from the agents’ undesirable
actions. The organization structure that minimizes the direct costs is the one that minimizes the
undesirable action for the type of agent that generates the greatest cost per unit of undesirable
action. Hence, which structure is best depends on the agents’ relative sensitivities to the social
norms, a and m, as well as the cost parameters kh and kl.
When the agents are more sensitive to social norms for the undesirable action, m . a, behavior
is primarily managed through the social norm for undesirable action. If the agents implementing
al impose the higher cost per unit of undesirable action, kl . kh, the direct cost of undesirable
action is minimized by having separate organizations because the social norm thwarting the
undesirable action faced by the agents implementing al is higher with separate organizations.


Similarly, for the undesirable action: Suh 5 2 uh and Sul 5 2ul.
In general, uh Z ûh and ul Z ûl. It can be shown that Nuh , Nû , Nul for m . 0.

10
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Among agents implementing al in a separate organization, the social norm for the undesirable
action is separate from, and so undiminished by, the negative influence of the agents implementing ah, who naturally take more undesirable action. If the cost of undesirable action is greater for
the agents implementing ah, then a single organization minimizes costs because the undesirable
action social norm faced by the agents implementing ah is higher due to the positive influence of
agents implementing al.
When the agents are more sensitive to the social norm for the desirable action, a . m, similar reasoning applies, although the outcome of that reasoning is different. In the case where the
agents implementing al generate a higher cost per unit of undesirable action, a single organization
minimizes the cost of undesirable action because of the positive influence that the agents implementing ah exert on the desirable action social norm faced by the agents implementing al. When
the agents implementing ah generate a higher cost per unit of undesirable action, separate organizations minimize the costs of undesirable actions because the agents implementing al do not have
a negative influence on the social norm for the desirable action of the agents implementing ah.
Proposition 1 summarizes the combined effects of the two sources of cost.
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that the agents are identical and that the principal seeks to induce
some proportion d of these agents to implement a high level of the desirable action, ah , and the
remainder to implement a low level of the desirable action, al , ah . The cost of inducing these
actions are lower if the agents assigned to produce ah are in a separate organization from the
agents assigned to produce al, if and only if: (i) the agents are more sensitive to the social norm
for the desirable action, that is a . m, and kh 2 kl is sufficiently large; (ii) the agents are more
sensitive to the social norm for the undesirable action, that is, m . a, and kh 2 kl is sufficiently
small; or (iii) the agents are equally sensitive to each social norm, a 5 m . 0.
B. Discussion
The case where the social norm for the undesirable action is more important to the determination of action choices offers a perspective on public accounting firms that provide both
consulting and auditing services. In such a professional services firm, the revenues secured by
a partner are a primary performance measure for that partner. A consequence of employing
revenue as a performance measure, however, is that each partner has incentives to set aside his
own professional judgment and appease client management to secure revenues from that client.
Furthermore, like the undesirable action in our model, appeasement is controlled to some extent
by a social norm for adhering to high professional standards.
Prominent commentators allege that there is a costly erosion of norms for auditors when a
public accounting firm provides both consulting and auditing services. For example, Arthur R.
Wyatt (2003, 17), formerly a senior partner and Managing Director–Accounting Principles at
Arthur Andersen (a once prominent but now defunct public accounting firm), emphasizes this
erosion in his account of the firm’s collapse: “The infusion of new personnel, some at relatively
high levels, who lacked a background that placed prominence on accounting professionalism
gradually gained increasing influence in accounting firms. … Staff personnel within the firms
were easily able to observe the attributes of those who were the rapidly rising stars and undertook
efforts to emulate these attributes. … [K]eeping the client happy and doing what was necessary
to retain the client achieved a prominence that did not exist prior to the advent of the successful
consulting arms with the firms. The core values of the professional firm were undermined by
primarily commercial interests.”11
11

See also Levitt (2000).
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We can frame Wyatt’s allegation in the context of the model by contrasting the costs of an
auditor and a consultant appeasing a client. Appeasement in an audit engagement can result in
the significant reputation and legal costs associated with an audit failure. Appeasement in a consulting engagement can result in the costs of a botched consulting assignment, which are likely
to be much lower than those of an audit failure (i.e., the k for auditing exceeds the k for consulting). Proposition 1 suggests that, if the incentives provided to consultants are more powerful than
those provided to auditors, splitting the firm into two organizations, audit and consulting, may be
valuable because doing so preserves a high social norm among auditors.
The benefit of dividing an organization to preserve norms must be weighed against the synergistic gains from combining in a single organization agents assigned to different tasks. For
example, synergies arise when auditors sell their firm’s consulting services to their audit clients.
If the synergies are so large that splitting up the organization is inefficient, then organizations
might adapt in other ways to preserve social norms. For instance, in firms combining auditing
and consulting services, the incentives for consultants may be weaker than those in a consulting-only firm, because weaker incentives 1i.e., lower bi’s2 imply that lower levels of the desirable
and undesirable actions are chosen by consultants. In turn, this leads to a higher social norm for
the undesirable action in the firm, which induces a lower level of the undesirable action from the
auditors. As another alternative, when norms are low, it becomes worthwhile to install additional
control systems. For instance, firms that combine consulting and auditing may implement more
extensive reviews of audit files by partners charged with quality control.
A related set of considerations follows from relaxing the assumption that the direct costs to
the principal of the undesirable actions are independent of the organizational structure. In particular, one might suspect that misconduct in one branch of a multiservice firm would adversely
affect the entire brand and not just the branch where it occurred, suggesting that kh and kl might
both be larger in a single organization. If so, incentives would be lower in larger organizations,
ceteris paribus.
V. Implementation Costs and Behavioral Traits

Research in social psychology suggests that individuals differ in how much they are influenced by a social, as opposed to a personal, norm.12 If individuals differ in their sensitivities to
social norms, two questions naturally arise. First, what type of individuals will an organization
prefer—those who are more sensitive to a social norm or those who are less sensitive? Second,
will an organization naturally attract the individuals with the preferred trait?
A. Which Behavioral Trait Is Preferred?
To assess which behavioral trait is preferred, assume the behavioral parameters are the same
for every agent: ai 5 a, mi 5 m, Ai 5 A, and Ui 5 U for all i [ I. Further, assume all agents are
assigned to the same organization and induced to undertake the same level of desirable action.
Given the assumption of interior choices for both actions, it follows from (12) and (13) that the
per capita cost of inducing action a in the organization is
1a 2 A2 11 2 a 2
(16) 	
C 1a 2 5 v 1 2 f 1 1a 2 A2 11 1 a 2 2 1 k c        2 Ud .
	1 2 m
12

See, for example, Kohlberg (1984) and Denis Arnold and Lawrence A. Ponemon (1991).
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PROPOSITION 2: Assume identical agents who make a desirable action choice and an undesirable action choice. If a is low, then the cost of implementing a for all agents in the organization
is increasing (decreasing) as the agents become more sensitive to the social norms for the desirable (undesirable) action: for a , A, dC 1 a 2/da . 0 and dC 1 a 2/dm , 0. If a is high, then the
converse is true: for a . A, dC 1 a 2/da , 0 and dC 1 a 2/dm . 0.
The intuition underlying Proposition 2 stems directly from the observation that the principal is
better off when the agents face higher norms 1i.e., higher Na and Nu 2. Given the relation between
norms and implementation costs, establishing the relation between the sensitivity to social norms
and implementation costs directly follows from the relation between the sensitivity to the social
norms and the norms faced by each agent. Consider, first, the agents’ sensitivity to the norm for
the desirable action. When a . A, the social norm for the desirable action, Sa 5 a, is greater
than the personal norm for the desirable action, A. Hence, the norm for the desirable action is
increasing in the sensitivity to the social norm for the desirable action, which implies that the
implementation costs are reduced when agents are more sensitive to the social norm for the desirable action. The converse is true when a , A.
Consider, next, the agents’ sensitivities to the norm for the undesirable action. When a . A, the
social norm for the undesirable action, Su 5 2u, is less than the personal norm for the undesirable action, U. The social norm is less than the personal norm because the higher level of desirable action requires incentives that are so strong that agents are induced to undertake a level of
undesirable action in excess of their personal norm for the undesirable action. Because the social
norm is less than the personal norm, the norm for the undesirable action is decreasing in the sensitivity to the underlying social norm. As a consequence, implementation costs are increasing in
the sensitivity to the social norm for the undesirable action. The opposite is true when a , A.
B. Will Agents Self-Select?
Having identified the agent traits the principal values, the second question raised earlier can
be addressed: when agent characteristics are not observable, will the principal be able to attract
the agents with the desired traits to the organization? To develop some insight, we consider a
simple setting, which we call the example setting. Assume half the agents are more sensitive to
one of the two social norms and the other half are less sensitive to that social norm. The agents
are otherwise identical. The principal forms an organization that will hire only half the agents
and induce action a from each of them. We consider two possible cases, one where agents differ
only in their sensitivity to the desirable action social norm and the other where they differ only
in their sensitivity to the undesirable action social norm. For each case, we assess whether the
principal can attract only the agents with the preferred sensitivity to the social norm.
Consider first the case where agents differ only in their sensitivity to the social norm for the
desirable action. Proposition 2 implies that the principal strictly prefers to hire agents with a
low sensitivity to the social norm for the desirable action if a is less than the common personal
norm for the desirable action A. Proposition 2 further implies that the principal strictly prefers
to hire agents with the high sensitivity to the social norm for the desirable action when a . A.
Observation 1 implies that the principal attracts exactly those agents when type is not observable
by offering the same contract as is optimal to offer when type is observable.
OBSERVATION 1: When agents must self-select in the example setting and the agents differ
only in their sensitivity to the social norm for the desirable action, the optimal contract offered
to the desired agent types in the setting where types are observable is accepted only by the
desired agent types in the setting where types are unobservable.
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Self-selection works in the principal’s interest in this case because the principal’s and agents’
interests are aligned. The principal wants to attract agents who can deliver desirable action at
the lowest cost, and the agent types naturally attracted to the organization are those who can
increase the performance measure at the lowest cost. When agents differ only in their sensitivity
to the social norm for the desirable action, the agents who deliver desirable action at the lowest
cost also deliver the performance measure at the lowest cost, so the most suitable agents are naturally attracted to the organization. Hence, the principal attracts the agents who are best suited to
the task without incurring adverse selection costs.
Consider, next, the case where the agents differ only in their sensitivity to the social norm for
the undesirable action. In this case, Proposition 2 implies that the principal strictly prefers to hire
agents with a high sensitivity to the social norm when a , A and the agents with a low sensitivity
when a . A. Observation 2 suggests that adverse selection problems are insurmountable when
there are unobserved differences in the sensitivity to social norms for undesirable actions.
OBSERVATION 2: When agents must self-select in the example setting and the agents differ
only in their sensitivity to the social norm for the undesirable action, there does not exist a
contract that attracts only the desired agent type and induces them to take the level of desirable
action a for any a Z A.
The self-selection problem arises in this case because the interests of the principal and agents
are not aligned. Recall that the principal wants to attract agents who can deliver desirable action
at the lowest cost, and agents naturally attracted to the organization are those who can increase
the performance measure at the lowest cost. When agents differ only in their sensitivity to the
social norm for the undesirable action, the principal wants those agents who have the highest
norm for the undesirable action, which are those who are most sensitive to the social norm for
the undesirable action when a , A and those who are least sensitive to that social norm when a .
A. In contrast, the agents who can generate the performance measure at the lowest cost are those
with the lowest norm for the undesirable action. Hence, the principal’s and agents’ interests are
not aligned and the principal always attracts the least suitable agents.
At a general level, these observations lead to predictions that particular organizations are
likely to attract agents with particular sensitivities to social norms, which in turn leads to differences in individual norms of behavior across (as opposed to within) organizations. If a profession
such as public accountancy or law is viewed as an organization, this implication is consistent
with the evidence in Ponemon and David R. L. Gabhart (1994) that individuals’ sensitivities to
norms vary systematically across professions. Furthermore, the existence of different norms at
different firms is consistent with survey findings in William J. Bruns and Kenneth A. Merchant,
Jr. (1990), who document a wide range of attitudes toward various types of undesirable earnings management activities across firms. In addition to providing a model that is consistent with
this evidence, our analysis yields the additional prediction that the power of financial incentives
should be related to the average sensitivity to social norms for individuals within an organization,
as well as the norms that emerge. For example, individuals at firms with high-powered incentives
are predicted to be more sensitive to norms of behavior regarding earnings management and to
exhibit lower norms of behavior (i.e., a higher tolerance) for earnings management.
C. Personal Norms
We have focused our analysis on differences in agents’ sensitivities to social norms because
they have been measured and studied by social psychologists. Nonetheless, we also point out
that issues of self-selection are likely to arise when agents have different personal norms 1i.e.,
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Ai Z Aj and Ui Z Uj for some agents i and j 2. The principal always prefers agents with higher
personal norms pertaining to both the desirable and undesirable actions because higher norms
promote the desirable action and thwart the undesirable action. Paralleling the discussion above,
when agents differ only in their personal norms for the desirable action in the example setting,
it can be shown that there is no costly adverse selection problem when type is not observable. In
contrast, when agents differ only in their personal norms for the undesirable action in the example setting, there is a costly adverse selection problem when type is not observable. In particular,
the principal attracts agents with a low personal norm whenever agents with a high personal
norm are attracted. Hence, self-selection again works in favor of the principal when there are
differences only in the norms for the desirable action, but works against the principal when there
are differences in the norms for the undesirable actions.
VI. Summary and Conclusion

We consider some implications of endogenous social norms for organizational design by analyzing a model in which a principal employs a continuum of agents who each choose two actions,
a desirable action that is beneficial to the principal and an undesirable action that is costly to the
principal. Each agent chooses a mix of these actions because both favorably affect the performance measure used for contracting with that agent. The critical aspect of social norms in our
model is that an agent’s behavior is influenced by the behavior of others in his organization. In
particular, the cost of an action to an agent is reduced as other agents in the same organization
engage in more of that action. Although it would be interesting to examine a setting in which
some agents have a disproportionate influence on norms, for example, highly visible leaders such
as politicians or CEOs who set the “tone at the top” of an organization, our analysis focuses on
the role of social norms in settings where no individual agent has a measurable impact on the
social norm, but the social norm is nevertheless endogenous and influences the action choice of
every agent.
Our analysis suggests that social norms influence three aspects of organization design: the
financial incentives provided to members of an organization, the boundaries of an organization,
and the types of agents in an organization. Social norms create multiplier effects associated with
changes in the power of financial incentives. Specifically, the effect of an increase in the power
of financial incentives on the desirable action is multiplied by the presence of a social norm for
the desirable action and reduced by the presence of a social norm for the undesirable action. It
follows that an increase in financial incentives may lead to larger or smaller changes than would
arise in the absence of norm considerations. Therefore, norms should influence the power of
financial incentives within an organization.
We demonstrate in a simple setting how it can be optimal to split an organization into two
separate organizations in order to eliminate the externalities the agents with high-powered
incentives create for those agents with low-powered incentives, and vice versa. These considerations emerge in ongoing debates such as whether accounting firms should provide both auditing
and consulting services. More generally, our analysis suggests that an organization’s boundaries
should be chosen in light of the norms those boundaries engender.
A last aspect of organization design that is likely to be influenced by the presence of social
norms is the types of agents that an organization attracts. Social psychology research suggests
that individuals differ in their sensitivities to social norms. Given such differences in individual
behavioral traits, two questions naturally arise: What behavioral traits does an organization prefer? And, can an organization attract the individuals with those traits? When agents differ in
their sensitivities to social norms for desirable actions, agents who are more sensitive to those
norms are preferred when high-powered incentives are employed (i.e., when the level of desirable
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action is high) because these agents incur the lowest cost for taking the desirable action. In contrast, agents who are less sensitive to the norm are preferred when low-powered incentives are
employed. Furthermore, agents with the desired trait are matched naturally to an organization
because the principal seeks agents with the lowest personal cost for the desirable action, and
the agents with the lowest cost of the desirable action are attracted naturally to the organization
because they can generate performance at the lowest personal cost.
When agents differ in their sensitivities to social norms for undesirable actions, agents who
are less sensitive to those norms are preferred when high-powered incentives are employed (i.e.,
when the level of desirable action is high) because these agents incur the highest cost for taking
the costly undesirable action. In contrast, agents who are more sensitive to the norm are preferred
when low-powered incentives are employed. Unlike the case where agents differ in their sensitivities to social norms for the desirable action, agents with the preferred trait do not self-select
into the organization because the principal seeks the agents with the highest personal cost for the
undesirable action, while the agents with the lowest personal cost for the undesirable action can
generate performance at the lowest personal cost.
Because the norms affecting undesirable actions and desirable actions can have different
implications, determining the social norm to which agents are most sensitive is key to assessing
how norms influence organizational design choices. We conjecture that norms for undesirable
actions are likely to be more important in settings where other barriers to performance measure
manipulation are weak or absent. For example, within the context of a firm, we expect that norms
relating to undesirable actions are relatively more important when the firm’s other monitoring
mechanisms, such as an active independent board, are weak; when the firm engages in transactions where the accounting is complex and requires significant subjective estimates; and when
the firm has significant leverage over its suppliers and customers, which makes it easier to collude with them to manipulate financial reports.
We have restricted our attention to the implications of social norms for organization design.
Social norm considerations, however, are relevant to other issues of economic interest such as
understanding how technological changes undermine the legal system and codes of ethical
behavior (i.e., standards of professional conduct and student honor codes that social norms support). For example, the development of the Internet and the digitization of copyrighted materials
have facilitated the undesirable acts of copyright violation via music file sharing and plagiarism,
not only by making such acts physically easier, but also by eroding the social norms that discouraged such acts. Accordingly, exploring the roles played by social norms should provide useful
insights in other areas of economic research.
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